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I. Introduction
Wage dispersion–a deviation from the law of one price in the labor market–is a subject of
long-standing theoretical and empirical interest in economics.2 In Gaumont, Schindler, and
Wright (2005), hereinafter referred to as GSW, we discuss several models of wage dispersion
in search equilibrium with wage posting. Models based on ex ante homogeneous agents but
ex post heterogeneous matches are shown to have advantages over earlier speciﬁcations based
on ex ante heterogeneity (e.g., Albrecht and Axell, 1984, or Diamond, 1987). In particular,
they do not “unravel” with the introduction of small but positive search costs. Although they
do admit deviations from the law of one price, however, models with ex post heterogeneity
are bound by the law of two prices (Curtis and Wright, 2004).
To explain this, suppose there are K possible realizations of the match-speciﬁcr a n d o m
variable. Then there are K distinct reservation wages, say wk, k =1 ,...K, and no proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrm would post anything but one of these wk. One can show that in a given
equilibrium, generically, no more than two of them actually are posted. What is unknown is
when we get two wages, as opposed to a single wage; and when we get two, which reservation
wages are posted–the two highest, the highest and the lowest, two consecutive wages, or
another combination. Here we present an example with K =3and characterize the outcome.
We show there is always a unique equilibrium, which will have one wage or two, depending
on parameters. Then we show that when the equilibrium has two wages, again depending
on parameters, these can be either w1 and w2, w2 and w3,o rw3 and w1.
This example is instructive because it helps us understand how and when wage dispersion
happens, and exactly what kinds of wage dispersion can arise. It is appealing that we have a
unique equilibrium, and the economic structure of this equilibrium is intuitively reasonable
and simple. It does take some eﬀort, however, to solve the example. In this paper, we show
h o wt od oi t .
II. The Model
T h e r ei sa[0,1] continuum of ﬁrms and a [0,L] continuum of workers. Time is continuous.
All agents live forever, are risk neutral, and discount at rate r.E a c h ﬁrm has a constant
returns technology with labor as the only input and productivity y. Firms with vacancies
contact workers at rate γ, and unemployed workers contact ﬁrms at rate α;t h e r ei sn oo n -
the-job search. For our purposes, it makes sense to set L =1 , so that the arrival rates α and
2See Mortensen (2003) or Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) for extended discussions and references.-4-
γ are eﬀectively pinned down exogenously, helping to keep the analysis simple.3 Matches
end at exogenous rate δ. Firms post wages to maximize expected proﬁt, given other ﬁrms’
wages and worker behavior.
Workers are ex ante homogeneous but matches are ex post heterogeneous. Thus, when a
worker contacts a ﬁrm he draws at random c ∈ {c1,...,cK},w h e r ec is the per period cost to
taking the job, with c1 <c 2 < ... < cK <y , and the probability of c = cj is λj. For example,
c could be the cost of commuting. Generally there is also an opportunity cost b to taking a
job, incorporating leisure, home production, etc. To reduce notation, normalize b =0 .A l s o ,
we assume that c is permanent for the duration of the match.4
Let Wj(w) be the value to having a job with wage w and c = cj,a n dU the value of
unemployed search. Clearly, conditional reservation wage strategies are optimal: given c = cj,
accept a job iﬀ w ≥ wj,w h e r eWj(wj)=U.N o t i c ewj+1 >w j. Hence there can be at most
K w a g e sp o s t e ds i n c e ,a si sc o m p l e t e l ys t a n d a r d ,n oﬁrm would post anything other than
one of the reservation wages: a ﬁrm posting w ∈ (wj,w j+1) could reduce w to wj and make
more proﬁt per worker without changing the set of workers who accept. Let θj denote the
fraction of ﬁrms posting wj,
P
j θj =1 .
A special case of this is the well-known result of Diamond (1971) that arises when K =1 :w i t h
homogeneous matches, all ﬁrms post w1 = c1. A problem with that model is that when there
is any cost to search, no matter how small, the market will shut down since workers get no
surplus from employment at w = c1. The same is true when there are ex ante heterogeneous
workers, say K distinct types with diﬀerent (but ﬁxed) values of c. The highest c workers
get no surplus from employment, so they drop out, and so on, and so the market “unravels”
and shuts down. This is why we study models with ex post heterogeneity; in these models,
as long as θ1 < 1, workers get gains from search (e.g. he may get oﬀer w>w 1 and draw
c = c1).







θi [Wj(wi) − U] (1)
and
rWj(w)=w − cj + δ[U − Wj(w)]. (2)
I nw o r d s ,( 1 )s a y st h a th ec o n t a c t sﬁrms at rate α,d r a w sc = cj with probability λj,
and accepts if the posted wage is wi ≥ wj, which occurs with probability θi.G i v e n w is
3This is because, with L =1 , the ratio of unemployed workers to vacancies is always 1. See GSW for
details concerning the arrival rates, and how to solve for them in equilibrium, in generalized versions of the
model.
4In GSW we also consider the case where employed workers draw a new c each period.-5-
acceptable, (2) says that an employed worker gets w−cj until the match ends, which occurs
at rate δ.U s i n gWj(wj)=U,w eh a v e
wj = cj + rU. (3)
Expected proﬁtf o raﬁrm posting a vacancy at wj is
Πj =
γρj (y − wj)
r + δ
=
γρj (y − cj − rU)
r + δ
, (4)
where γ is the arrival rate of workers, ρj =
Pj
h=1 λh is the probability a random worker
accepts, and we use (3) to substitute for wj in terms of U. A sw es a i d ,n oﬁrm posts
anything other than one of the K reservation wages. Following Curtis and Wright (2004),
one can strengthen this to show that generically there are no more than two wages posted.
Proposition 1 For generic parameter values, we can have θh > 0 for at most two values of
h.
Proof. Suppose θi > 0, θj > 0, θk > 0 for distinct i, j,a n dk.T h e n Πi = Πj = Πk =
max{Π1,...,ΠK}. Hence, gi(U)=gj(U)=gk(U),w h e r ef r o m( 4 )
gh(U) ≡ ρh(y − ch) − rρhU.
For generic parameter values, there does not exist a solution U to gi(U)=gj(U)=gk(U).
In GSW we studied the case K =2 . We showed there always exists a unique equilibrium,
which may or may not entail wage dispersion. If y is small, all ﬁrms post w1 = c1;i fy is big
all ﬁrms post w2 ∈ (c2,y);a n di fy is intermediate, a fraction post w1 ∈ (c1,w 2) while the
rest post w2 ∈ (c2,y). For other values of K, although we know there can be no more than
two wages posted, we do not know when there are two, as opposed to one. And when there
are two, we also do not know which of the two reservation wages they will be.
III. The Example
Consider K =3 . As the only wages posted are in {w1,w 2,w 3},w ew r i t eWij = Wi(wj) for
the value of employment at reservation wage wj when a worker draws ci. Then (1) and (2)
reduce to
rU = αθ2λ1 (W12 − U)+αθ3 [λ1 (W13 − U)+λ2 (W23 − U)]
rWij = wj − ci + δ(U − Wij).-6-
Here we use the result that a worker who draws w = wj and c = cj gets no surplus from the
match (in equilibrium he still accepts). Using wj = cj + rU,
rU = ηθ2λ1 (c2 − c1)+ηθ3λ1 (c3 − c1)+ηθ3λ2 (c3 − c2), (5)




i=1 λi (y − wj).
By Proposition 1, at least one θj =0 ,s ot h e r ea r ee x a c t l y6 possible equilibria as listed
in Table 1. We now give conditions determining when each equilibrium exists. We give
these conditions in two ways: as restrictions on y, which are relatively easy and facilitate
comparison with earlier work (e.g. the results reported in the last paragraph of Section 2);
and as restrictions on λ =( λ1,λ 2), which provide a nice graphical representation of the
equilibrium set. To begin, it will be useful to deﬁne the following:
y
1 = ηλ1 (c2 − c1)+
c3 − (λ1 + λ2)c2
1 − λ1 − λ2
and y1 = y





and y2 = y
2 + η[λ1 (c3 − c1)+λ2 (c3 − c2)]
y
3 =
(λ1 + λ2)c2 − λ1c1
λ2
and y3 = y
3 + ηλ1 (c2 − c1)






Given all ﬁrms post w = w1 = c1,n oﬁrm wants to deviate and post w2 iﬀ Π2 ≤ Π1 and no









Algebra implies Π2 ≤ Π1 iﬀ y ≤ y
3 and Π3 ≤ Π1 iﬀ y ≤ y
2. The corresponding conditions in
λ-space are given by
λ1 ≥ ˜ λ1 ≡
y − c3
y − c1





This gives necessary and suﬃcient conditions for equilibrium 1.-7-
Table 1. Possible Equilibria
Equilibrium 1 Equilibrium 2 Equilibrium 3 Equilibrium 4 Equilibrium 5 Equilibrium 6
θ1 =1 θ2 =1 θ3 =1 θ1θ2 > 0 θ1θ3 > 0 θ2θ3 > 0
Equilibrium 2: θ2 =1 .G i v e nθ2 =1 , rU = ηλ1(c2 −c1) by (5), and hence wj = cj +rU =












(y − c3 − rU).
No ﬁrm wants to deviate and post w1 iﬀ Π1 ≤ Π2, which holds iﬀ y ≥ y3,a n dn oﬁrm will
deviate and post w3 iﬀ Π3 ≤ Π2, which holds iﬀ y ≤ y
1.I nλ-space, these conditions on y
can be expressed as
λ1 < ˆ λ1 ≡
y − c2
η(c2 − c1)
λ2 ≥  2 (λ1) ≡
(1 − λ1)[y − ηλ1(c2 − c1)] − c3 + λ1c2
y − ηλ1 (c2 − c1) − c2
(7)
λ2 >  3 (λ1) ≡
λ1 (c2 − c1)
y − c2 − ηλ1 (c2 − c1)
.
The properties of the   functions are given below, but we need some properties of  3 now to
conclude the following: although y3 ≤ y ≤ y
1 is also satisﬁed if the above three inequalities
are all reversed, this case can be ignored because λ1 > ˆ λ1 implies  3 (λ1) < 0. Thus, (7) gives
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for equilibrium 2.
Lemma 1  3(λ1) goes through the origin, is strictly increasing, strictly convex and positive
if λ1 < ˆ λ1, and strictly concave and negative if λ1 > ˆ λ1, with a discontinuity at λ1 = ˆ λ1.
Proof.  3 (0) = 0 is obvious. The ﬁrst derivative is  0
3 =
(y−c2)(c2−c1)
[y−c2−ηλ1(c2−c1)]2 > 0. The second
derivative is  00
3 =
2η(c2−c1)
[y−c2−ηλ1(c2−c1)]3 which is positive if λ1 < ˆ λ1 and negative otherwise.
Equilibrium 3: θ3 =1 .G i v e n θ3 =1we can solve for rU, wj,a n dΠj,a n dc h e c kt h a t
no ﬁrm will deviate iﬀ y ≥ y1 and y ≥ y2.T h eﬁrst condition y ≥ y1 c a nb ew r i t t e na sa-8-
quadratic in λ2 for a given λ1,s a yQ(λ2)=Aλ
2
2 + Bλ2 + C ≥ 0,w h e r e
A = η(c3 − c2)
B = −y + c2 + ηλ1 (c3 − c1) − η(1 − λ1)(c3 − c2)
C =( 1 − λ1)y − c3 + λ1c2 − η(1 − λ1)λ1 (c3 − c1).
It is easy to see that Q(λ2) is convex and Q(λ2) < 0 at λ2 =1− λ1. Hence, Q(λ2) has two
real roots that depend on λ1,s a y −(λ1) and  +(λ1), one on each side of 1 − λ1. Since only
λ2 ≤ 1 − λ1 is relevant, we conclude that Q(λ2) ≥ 0 iﬀ







The second condition y ≥ y2 is equivalent to
λ2 ≤  4(λ1)=
(1 − λ1)y − c3 + λ1c1 − η(1 − λ1)λ1 (c3 − c1)
η(1 − λ1)(c3 − c2)
.




− (λ1),  4 (λ1)
ª
. (8)
The description above exhausts the single-wage equilibria. By inspection of the y-cutoﬀs,
these cases are mutually exclusive, so there cannot be multiple single-wage equilibria. We
now consider two-wage equilibria.
Equilibrium 4: θ1,θ 2 >θ 3 =0 . This equilibrium requires Π2 = Π1, an equality that can
be solved for
θ2 =
λ2y − (λ1 + λ2)c2 + λ1c1
ηλ1λ2 (c2 − c1)
.





, which is equivalent to λ2 >  1 (λ1) and
λ2 <  3 (λ1) if λ1 < ˆ λ1; λ2 >  3 (λ1) if λ1 > ˆ λ1.
No ﬁrm wants to deviate and post w3, rather than either w1 or w2,i ﬀ5
λ2 ≥  5(λ1)=
λ1(1 − λ1)(c2 − c1)
c3 − λ1c1 − (1 − λ1)c2
.
Hence, equilibrium 4 exists iﬀ
λ2 <  3 (λ1) if λ1 < ˆ λ1;a n dλ2 > max{ 5 (λ1),  1 (λ1)}. (9)
5There is no corresponding condition in terms of y: for equilibria 4-6, the no deviation conditions depend
only on λ2 versus  5(λ1).-9-
Equilibrium 5: θ1,θ 3 >θ 2 =0 . This requires Π3 = Π1,w h i c hc a nb es o l v e df o r
θ3 =
(1 − λ1)y − c3 + λ1c1









, which is equivalent to λ1 < ˜ λ1 and λ2 >  4(λ1).N oﬁrm
wants to deviate and post w2 iﬀ λ2 ≤  5(λ1). Hence equilibrium 5 exists iﬀ
λ1 < ˜ λ1, λ2 >  4(λ1),a n dλ2 ≤  5(λ1). (10)
Equilibrium 6: θ2,θ 3 >θ 1 =0 . This requires Π3 = Π2,w h i c hc a nb es o l v e df o r
θ2 = −
(1 − λ1 − λ2)Ψ − c3 +( λ1 + λ2)c2
η(1 − λ1 − λ2)(λ1 + λ2)(c3 − c2)
,
where Ψ = y−ηλ1 (c3 − c1)−ηλ2 (c3 − c2). Observe that the denominator in this expression
is the quadratic Q(λ2) deﬁned in the discussion of equilibrium 3. Hence, we can write





,w h i c hi se q u i v a l e n tt oλ1 < ˆ λ1, λ2 >  −(λ1),a n dλ2 <  2(λ1).
Actually, the condition θ<1 is also satisﬁed if λ1 > ˆ λ1 and λ2 >  2 (λ1), but the following
lemma shows that this can never be satisﬁed in the relevant region.
Lemma 2  2(0) =
y−c3
y−c2 ∈ (0,1);  2(λ1) →− ∞as λ1 → ˆ λ1 from below;  2(λ1) →∞as
λ1 → ˆ λ1 from above;  2(λ1) > 1 − λ1 iﬀ λ1 > ˆ λ1;  2(λ1) → 1 − λ1 from above as λ1 →∞ ;
 2(λ1) → 1 − λ1 from below as λ1 →− ∞ ;  2(λ1) >  −(λ1).
Proof. The ﬁrst parts involve straightforward analysis. Proving  2(λ1) → 1−λ1 is equivalent
to proving  2(λ1)/(1 − λ1) → 1, which follows from l’Hôpital’s rule. For the last part, observe
that ∂θ2/∂λ1 > 0; hence, as we increase λ1 for any given λ2,w eh i tt h et h r e s h o l da tw h i c h
θ2 =0before we hit the threshold at which θ2 =1 . This means the  2(λ1) curve lies above
the  −(λ1) curve in (λ1,λ 2) space.
Finally, no ﬁrm wants to deviate and post w1 iﬀ λ2 ≥  5(λ1). Hence equilibrium 6 exists iﬀ
λ1 < ˆ λ1, λ2 > 
−(λ1), λ2 <  2(λ1) and λ2 ≥  5(λ1). (11)
The completes our analysis of every case in Table 1. For each candidate equilibrium 1-6 we
provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for existence in terms of y and also λ.W e c a n
summarize the results as follows:
Proposition 2 Generically equilibrium exists and is unique. If λ2 <  5 (λ1) then: equilibrium
1 exists iﬀ y ≤ y
2; equilibrium 5 exists iﬀ y ∈ (y
2,y2); and equilibrium 3 exists iﬀ y ≥ y2.-1 0-
If λ2 >  5 (λ1) then: equilibrium 1 exists iﬀ y ≤ y
3;e q u i l i b r i u m4e x i s t si ﬀ y ∈ (y
3,y3);
equilibrium 2 exists iﬀ y ∈ (y3,y
1);e q u i l i b r i u m6e x i s t si ﬀ y ∈ (y
1,y1); and equilibrium 3
exists iﬀ y ≥ y1.
Proof. There are two generic cases, λ2 <  5 (λ1) and λ2 >  5 (λ1). In the former case it is
clear that for all y there is a unique equilibrium. The same is true in the latter case once
one recognizes that y3 <y
1 in the case where λ2 >  5 (λ1).
In order to present the results graphically, we move to λ-space, and make use of conditions
(6)-(11). To do so, we ﬁrst describe some more properties of the  j functions used in these
conditions. Proofs are omitted where obvious.
Lemma 3  −(0) ∈ (0,1).T h e r ei sau n i q u eλ
0
1 ∈ (0,1) such that  −(λ
0
1)=0 .
Proof. For the ﬁrst part, note that λ1 =0implies Q(0) > 0 and Q(1) < 0,a n ds i n c eQ(λ2)
has two real roots  −(0) and  +(0), one on each side of 1 − λ1,w ec o n c l u d e −(0) ∈ (0,1).
The second part is shown by noting that λ1 =1implies Q(0) < 0, which in turn implies
 −(1) < 0. Convexity of Q then implies the existence of a unique λ
0




Lemma 4  5 (λ1) is concave, lies below λ2 =1− λ1, and goes through (0,0) and (1,0).
Lemma 5  4 (λ1) is monotonically decreasing with  4(0) = (y − c3)/η(c3 − c2) > 0.




Lemma 7  −(λ1),  5(λ1) and  4(λ1) intersect at the same point λ
a
1.
Proof. This follows from considering the corresponding functions in y-space, y1 and y2,
where it is easy to show that y1 = y2 iﬀ λ2 =  5.
Lemma 8  5(λ1),  2(λ1) and  3(λ1) intersect at the same point λ
b
1 < ˆ λ1.
Proof. That the three functions intersect at the same point λ
b
1 follows from simple algebra.
Then λ
b
1 < ˆ λ1 follows from the properties of  2 (λ1) which imply that if  2 intersects with
another function within the simplex, it must be at some λ1 < ˆ λ1.-1 1-
Figure 1. Equilibrium Regions
Lemma 9  5(λ1) and  1(λ1) intersect at λ
c








Proof. Note ﬁrst that  3 (λ1) >  1 (λ1) for all λ1 > 0,a n d 3 (λ1),  1 (λ1) <  5 (λ1) for small
λ1, which follows from noting that  3(0) =  1(0) = 0 and  0
3(0) =  0
1(λ1)=c2−c1
y−c2 <  0
5(0) =
c2−c1








1, we claim that  −(λ1) <  2(λ1) for
all λ1 such that  −(λ1) >  5 (λ1). Suppose not. Then if  −(λ1) >  2(λ1) for some λ1 such
that  −(λ1) >  5 (λ1), equilibria 2 and 3 coexist, and we would contradict the uniqueness
part of Proposition 2; and if  −(λ1) >  2(λ1) for all λ1 such that  −(λ1) >  5 (λ1),w ew o u l d
contradict the existence part. Consequently,  −(λ1) intersects  5(λ1) at a smaller λ1 than
does  2(λ1).
Lemma 11  −(λ1) <  4(λ1) for λ2 >  5(λ1) and  −(λ1) >  4(λ1) for λ2 <  5(λ1).-1 2-
Table 2.  Wa g e s
Equilibrium Wages wj for j =1 ,2,3
1. θ1 =1 wj = cj
2. θ2 =1 wj = cj + ηλ1(c2 − c1)
3. θ3 =1 wj = cj + ηλ1(c3 − c1)+ηλ2(c3 − c2)
4. θ1θ2 > 0 wj = cj + y +
λ1c1−(λ1+λ2)c2
λ2
5. θ1θ3 > 0 wj = cj + y + λ1c1−c3
1−λ1
6. θ2θ3 > 0 wj = cj + y +
(λ1+λ2)c2−c3
1−λ1−λ2
Proof. It must be true that  −(λ1) <  4(λ1) iﬀ  4(λ1) >  5 (λ1), otherwise we violate the
existence or uniqueness part of Proposition 2.
Given these properties we can draw the  -functions, as shown in Figure 1 for two sets of
parameter values. It is now a simple matter to ﬁll in the diﬀerent regions generated by the
 -functions with the equilibrium that exists in each case. In terms of economics, the results
are quite intuitive. Consider, for example, the case of λ1 close to 1. Then we get a single-
wage equilibrium, all ﬁrms post the lowest reservation wage w1,w h i c hm a x i m i z e sp r o ﬁtp e r
worker, and does not reduce the hiring probability too much as λ1 is big. As λ2 becomes big
we get equilibrium where all ﬁrms post w2,a n da sλ3 becomes big we get wage equilibrium
where all ﬁrms post w3, because ﬁrms are willing to sacriﬁce proﬁt per worker to keep the
hiring probability from falling too much.
When we are in a region between those with a single-wage equilibrium, we get wage disper-
sion; for example, between the regions where all ﬁrms post w1 and where all ﬁrms post w2,
some ﬁrms post w1 and others w2.T h e ﬁgure illustrates two key points. First, two-wage
equilibria are not especially rare. Second, when two-wage equilibria exist, they may entail
any combination of w1, w2 and w3. Of course, these wages are themselves endogenous — they
depend on the equilibrium as well as parameters. Table 2 lists wages in each equilibrium,
including those that are not posted; note that in each case, consistent with (3), we have
wj = cj + rU.
In Figure 2, we plot the average wage w,p r o ﬁt Π, unemployment u,a n dt h ef r a c t i o no f
ﬁrms posting each wage, as functions of productivity y, leaving explicit calculations as an
exercise.6 There are two panels, corresponding to the two cases in Proposition 2: λ2 <  5 (λ1)
6T h eo n l yv a r i a b l ew eh a v en o td e ﬁned is unemployment which, as is standard, evolves according to
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and λ2 >  5 (λ1).T h i sﬁgure shows the intuitive result that higher productivity must beneﬁt
either ﬁrms or workers in terms of wages or proﬁt, but interestingly, never at the same time:
Π is constant in single-wage equilibria and w is constant in two-wage equilibria. Also, u is
constant in single-wage equilibria and decreasing in y in two-wage equilibria.7
IV. Conclusion
We analyzed in detail the case of K =3in a model with wage posting and ex post het-
erogeneity. We found that a unique equilibrium exists which may or may not exhibit wage
dispersion. Also, any pair of reservation wages may be posted. We think the results teach us
something interesting about endogenous wage dispersion and search theory more generally.
7The shapes in the ﬁgure are general with the exception of the relative position of Π and w. In general,
we can have w<Π or vice versa, although for small y we must have w>Π and for very large y we must
have w<Π.P u td i ﬀerently, for very small (large) y workers extract a higher (lower) share of the surplus
than ﬁrms.-1 4-
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